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For 45 years, Western Intelligence had ONE, major raison d’être: to prevent a surprise attack from 
the USSR by monitoring its capacities, capabilities and intentions, and hence enabling the West to 
meet any potential threat with Armed Forces capable of deterring any USSR military adventure. 
The major Western Intelligence agencies were created for this major mission, and constructed 
to meet this task – and for 45 years, this was basically what Western Intelligence did. But in 1991, 
most of this became obsolete overnight with the collapse of the USSR. Meanwhile, new threats 
and new enemies had gathered strength while few had noticed, building up their capacities to at-
tack the West – culminating in the terror attacks upon the US on September 11. 2001. Few saw this 
coming, because radars, antennas and binoculars had mostly been directed towards the Soviet 
Union.  
Since 1991, the West has been engaged in a number of wars and conflicts – and it still is. This 
paper will demonstrate that Western Intelligence was poorly suited to meet the new Post-Cold 
War challenges, but even more disturbing: that it took most of the period in question before signs 
of real improvements were seen. But Western Intelligence learned by trial-and-error, and gradually 
intelligence support to military operations improved. A closer cooperation between the strategic, 
operational and tactical intelligence levels has emerged, above all in the shape of a little known, 
little published MI activity called National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs). This paper will 
conclude that NISTs are seemingly the best examples today, not only on how MI, but intelligence 
overall should work: drawing upon and combining the best resources available in both military 
and civilian intelligence, and from all levels.
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7Forord
Slutten på den kalde krigen og bortfallet av det mer statiske trussel-
bildet som Sovjetunionen og Øst-Blokken representerte, førte til store 
endringer i vestlige lands militære etterretningstjenester. I denne 
andre utgivelsen av Forsvarets stabsskoles skriftserie tar forfatteren 
for seg hvordan vestlig militær etterretning har utviklet seg etter 
Sovjetunionens sammenbrudd. Utgivelsen er en noe redigert versjon 
av Bjørn Aksel Sunds masteroppgave fra King’s College, London.
Den kalde krigens slutt førte ikke til det den amerikanske stats-
viteren Francis Fukuyama i 1989 beskrev som ”The end of History” 
med hensyn til menneskehetens ideologiske utvikling gjennom 
demokratiets endelige seier, og dermed en fredeligere verden. Tvert i 
mot blusset gamle latente konflikter opp igjen, og førte til en tilsyne-
latende mer konfliktfylt verden. Endringer i de internasjonale makt-
forholdene bidro til å øke forekomsten av militære intervensjoner, 
oftest gjennomført av vestlige land innen en NATO-, FN-, EU- eller 
koalisjonsramme. Utviklingen førte til et vesentlig endret og mer 
dynamisk behov for militær etterretningsstøtte både på strategisk, 
operasjonelt og taktisk nivå. Den gjorde seg i høy grad også gjeldende 
i Norge gjennom deltagelsen i operasjonene på for eksempel Balkan 
og i Afghanistan.
I følge forfatteren var vestlig etterretning dårlig rustet til å gi mer 
dynamisk støtte til de nye militære operasjonene. Etterretnings-
organisasjonene var fra starten preget av statiske tankesett, liten 
oppfinnsomhet, svak innsikt i andre kulturer og deres tenkemåter 
samt utstrakt intern konkurranse. Gjennom en serie av casestudier 
søker han å dokumentere hvordan militær etterretningsstøtte har 
utviklet seg til dagens nivå, gjennom det han kaller en evolusjon 
over de siste 15 årene.
Den utvikling forfatteren beskriver kjenner vi igjen når det gjelder 
norsk etterretning. Gjennom enkelte medieoppslag er vi kjent med at 
norsk etterretning var aktive og gav tidsriktig og verdifull etterret-
ning til alle nivåer fra et tidlig tidspunkt på Balkan ut over 1990-tal-
let. Vi vet at vår etterretningsorganisasjons innsats er avgjørende 
for effektiviteten av operasjonene vi gjennomfører i Afghanistan, og 
ikke minst sikkerheten til personellet som gjennomfører dem. I dette 
8perspektivet er utgivelsen av Bjørn Aksel Sunds masteroppgave fra 
King’s College i London vel verdt å lese. 
Håkon Tronstad
Sjef Forsvarets stabsskole
9Introduction 
The end of the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
was greeted by the ‘Free World’ as the ultimate triumph of the Western liberal 
democracies, yet despite this, the old Cold War was converted into new wars 
that were ‘hot’ rather than cold. When Francis Fukuyama hailed the arrival of 
‘the end of history’1 (nothing less), swords began to be beaten into ploughshares2 
in both East and West.  Friendship should now replace enmity; trust should 
succeed suspicion. And indeed: some former foes became friends (sort of), and 
former opponents opened up to the prospect of trade, trust and cooperation. 
Large, standing armies were to be substantially reduced, stockpiled arrays of 
weapons started to be scrapped, and defence-related activities were downsized 
– including intelligence. It seemed logical, especially to politicians who could 
see better use for the billions spent on intelligence,3 to also cut intelligence 
budgets4 in this new era of (expected) peace – and so they did. 5   
Alas, this idyll lasted for less than two years.6 The Garden of Eden housed 
snakes, now free to pray under improved living conditions. As observed by 
former CIA director James Woolsley: ‘(...) the CIA had fought a dragon for forty 
years but now faced lots of poisonous snakes (...)’.7  Now ancient ethnic and 
religious tensions and unsettled disputes that had been suppressed for decades 
re-emerged, whereas nationalism replaced communism in Eastern Europe. After 
decades of serving as battlegrounds for proxy wars, similar events took place 
in Africa and the Middle East, where Iraq’s despotic ruler, Saddam Hussein 
(practically bankrupt after ten years of war with Iran) soon found it too temp-
ting to resist invading the (rich) small neighbour of Kuwait. Adding to all this: 
hatred fermented among extreme Islamists, especially in Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, 
Jordan, Yemen and Iran. 
Consequently, the West has, either in the shape of NATO- or UN-mandated 
missions, or as multilateral coalitions, been engaged in a number of wars and 
conflicts since 1991 – and it still is. 
The aim of this paper is to explore how intelligence Support to Military 
Operations (SMO) has performed since 1991, starting with a historical outline 
to define what Military Intelligence (MI) is. It will then, based on a sufficient 
understanding of intelligence/MI (its possibilities as well as limits) proceed 
in turn to investigate how MI has developed after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. It will be argued that notions implying ‘revolutionary’ changes should 
be discarded, serving only to confuse what intelligence/MI is, how it should 
be used and what it may not be able to do. Rather, as will be demonstrated, an 
10
evolution is ever ongoing, and the most important lessons learned for the craft 
of MI in the Post-Cold War era will be identified through selected case studies 
of the most important wars involving Western MI since 1991. Intelligence, by 
its nature ‘secret’, poses certain challenges to students and scholars who write 
UNCLASSIFIED works. Hence, the research for this paper has been carried 
out through an extensive literature review of the topics covered. Findings in 
the literature, reports and articles are supplemented (and controlled) by inter-
viewing four military officers – two UK and two Norwegian – who in sum 
possess extensive, first-hand experience from not only a broad range of military 
service (MI included), but also active service in the operations analysed here.
It will be demonstrated that Western Intelligence – MI included – was poorly 
suited to meet the new Post-Cold War challenges, but even more disturbing: 
that it took most of the period in question before signs of real improvements 
were seen. It will be argued that the major reasons for these shortcomings are 
basically of a human, psychological nature: lack of cognition, imagination and 
insight into other cultures and hence into foreign mindsets (terrorist mindsets 
included), lack of timeliness and progress, combined with a destructive level 
of both intra- and inter-agency rivalry and hence a lack of will and ability to 
join forces and to co-operate.  
Nevertheless, there are signs of improvements. The major research finding 
is that a closer cooperation between the strategic, operational and tactical 
intelligence levels is emerging, above all in the shape of a little known, little 
published MI activity called National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) 
and a few, related units sharing the NIST attitude towards MI. This paper will 
conclude that NISTs are seemingly the best examples today, not only on how 
MI, but intelligence overall should work: drawing upon and combining the best 
resources available in both military and civilian intelligence, and from all levels.
11
1) The Foe Behind the Hill.
A Historic Outline of Military Intelligence and its Role in Military 
Operations
‘The Duke of Wellington was once asked what he did during the 
long, lonely hours of the night before a major battle was due to 
take place. He could not sleep, the Duke replied, because his 
mind was obsessed with one question. A question he asked him-
self over and over: “What’s on the other side of the hill?”’.8   
Military Intelligence (MI) originates from a military commander’s need to 
have the crucial question of ‘what’s on the other side of the hill’ answered. The 
commander will always need to know as much as possible about his foe: its 
weaponry, strengths and weaknesses, capacities and capabilities.9 All through 
history have military commanders asked themselves the same question, long 
before the Duke of Wellington, and they still do on today’s battlefields.10 This 
demonstrates that the main characteristics of MI were known and practised 
centuries – even millennia ago. They were in use at least since the time of the 
biblical descriptions of the first mission to send selected tribesmen out to ‘go 
spy the land’.11  That said, some scholars trace the heritage of MI even further 
back in history. The basic disagreements seem to swivel around the question of 
how rudimentary the craft of intelligence gathering can be and still be acknow-
ledgeable as ‘MI’. There are scholars who see MI as old as the history of man.12 
Or in the words of the former inspector general of the CIA, Frederick P. Hitz: 
‘(...) Tribes, ethnicities, and other authorities have always want-
ed to know what their enemies or rivals were planning to do to 
them or how they might act to protect a perceived vital interest. 
If the rival power refused to share the information, it had to be 
stolen or suborned (...)’.13 
Professor Arther Ferrill traces organised MI back to the very earliest stages of 
history, arguing that even prehistoric clans in the Neolithic period had develo-
ped a system of ‘spies and scouts’ which should be recognised as MI.14 Peter 
Gudgin argues along the same lines, claiming that MI is ‘as old as warfare 
itself’,15 as does Michael Handel.16 To determine whether this is a plausible view, 
one needs to decide if the most basic principles of ‘scouting and spying’ are 
considered sufficient to be regarded as (early) MI. This is basically a matter of 
choice. The scholars mentioned above are among those who view the history 
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of MI along these lines, hence their stance that MI is as old as history itself – a 
perfectly sound perception. 
However, other scholars may acknowledge the existence in principle of 
rudimentary MI since the earliest times, but rather regard a more developed 
level of the craft as being MI in the way the term is understood today.  Among 
them is Christopher Andrew, who seems to regard medieval Europe as the 
cradle of ‘modern’ MI, since this was the era when spying and espionage 
became a profession in its own right.17 Andrew cites Christopher Allmand, as 
the latter claims that the end of the Middle Ages was the time when espionage 
really became important, ‘(...) “this was the period when (spies) first really 
came into their own”’.18  Christopher Andrew further underlines that the first 
‘modern’ European intelligence branch emerged in Elizabethan England, under 
the Queen’s Spymaster Sir Francis Walsingham, who created an advanced spy 
network operating all over Europe.19 
Nevertheless, there is one major obstacle to neglecting pre-Middle Ages 
MI as being too rudimentary to be viewed as MI: the detailed, ancient texts of 
(or at least attributed to) Sun Tzu going back to the 6th century BC. In ‘The 
Art of War’, the main principles and the core questions, as well as the crucial 
role of MI in any military campaign, are all outlined. This being so, it can be 
stated that the fundamentals of Military Intelligence were established more 
than 2,500 years ago. Sun Tzu says that without sufficient MI, no general 
should go to war, since MI is the prerequisite for victory: ‘One who knows the 
enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. 
(..)’.20 Sun Tzu’s teachings on MI underline the importance of collecting intel-
ligence on not only every vital aspect of the enemy: its lords and generals, and 
their skills, plans and intents, but also their soldiers, their fighting standard 
and level of motivation. He points out the importance of knowing the terrain 
and infrastructure (the land on which to advance, camp, defend or attack) and 
its importance for a successful outcome of the battle: the (...) ‘topography of 
mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes (...)’,21  in 
other words: terrain and climate. 
But Sun Tzu does not stop there, because no MI teachings would be com-
plete without emphasising the very means necessary to collect information and 
intelligence: spies, infiltrators and agents. After describing the main types of 
spies available to a military commander, Sun Tzu teaches that ‘(...) advance 
knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, (...) but must be gained 
from men for it is the knowledge of the enemy’s true situation.’22 
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Finally, Sun Tzu even reflects upon the psychological bounds between a 
good agent and his/her master, as well as between intelligence professionals: 
‘(...) no relationship is closer than with spies, no rewards are more generous 
than those given to spies, no affairs are more secret than those pertaining to 
spies’.23 The importance of these words has (out of necessity) been redisco-
vered by Western Intelligence since 1991, as will be demonstrated in the final 
chapter of this paper.
However, there is one impediment to seeing Sun Tzu’s writings as evidence 
of an unbroken lineage of such an advanced MI worldwide: they were unknown 
outside the borders of China until they were translated into French in 1772.24 
That said, it may safely be assumed that the craft of MI was carried out pretty 
much along the lines described by Sun Tzu in every war, simply because of the 
nature of warfare.25 As demonstrated, wherever and whenever there is a battle to 
be fought, the military commander will need to ask the same questions: where 
is the enemy? What are his strengths and weaknesses? How is the terrain? 
How should I best utilise my spies and agents? In other words: every major 
MI principle observed and described by Sun Tzu. 
European writings on MI occurred much later, although European military 
commanders also relied upon MI throughout the history of warfare. But it 
was not until Carl von Clausewitz wrote his ‘On War’ and Baron de Jomini 
published his ‘The Art of War’ some 200 years after Walsingham’s efforts to 
create a ‘modern’ spy network in the 1570’s,26 that major philosophical texts 
dealt with MI in a broader context. Von Clausewitz is traditionally viewed as 
rather sceptical of the usefulness of MI,27 and admittedly he is seemingly less 
impressed by the level of certainty, accuracy, and hence usefulness, of the intel-
ligence he had experienced himself.28 It falls outside the limits of this paper to 
analyse this any deeper, but it should be underlined that even von Clausewitz 
does describe intelligence as being ‘(...) the basis, in short, of our own plans and 
operations.(...)’.29 Bearing in mind that von Clausewitz regarded intelligence as 
being ‘(...) every sort of information about the enemy and his country (...)’,30 
which indicates that von Clausewitz acknowledged the need to possess this 
information (intelligence), but was sceptical towards the MI personnel available 
to military commanders in his days, and their (lack of) ability to provide their 
commanders with actionable intelligence. Von Clausewitz, like every military 
commander in history, was deeply concerned about the ‘fog and friction of 
war’.31 What von Clausewitz does though is observe the difficulties implied in 
MI, and the caution any commander should take when dealing with the intel-
ligence s/he is provided with:
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‘The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, 
because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a 
mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect 
of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions 
and [an] unnatural appearance’.32
This encapsulates yet another important aspect of intelligence: its incomplete-
ness and hence its limitations. These words of warning from von Clausewitz 
are both timeless and timely, as repeatedly demonstrated through history. Chris-
topher Andrew is among the many thinkers on intelligence to underline this, as 
he warns about three fundamental challenges when dealing with MI.33 First, he 
states, MI should not be wholly entrusted to civilians. Military knowledge and 
experience is paramount to fully understanding and conducting MI. Second, 
Andrew underlines that MI cannot operate in isolation: a military threat can-
not be understood without political as well as military intelligence. In his own 
words: ‘(...) Civil-military relations will never be free from tension. But intel-
ligence, like warfare, works best when “frocks” and “brass hats” co-operate.
(...)’.34 Andrew’s third point is simply that MI has its limitations, due to it being 
no exact science. MI is fundamentally both ‘fallible and indispensable’, as he 
states. These views correlate with any major works on intelligence today. MI 
can never be anything else, or anything more, than a ‘best assessment’ based 
on the sum of the information made available by its collectors, and the skills 
of the analysts processing it. Finally, it also depends on the skills of the users 
when being presented with it.35 Colonel Hughes-Wilson has reflected on these 
matters, and has concluded that, in his own words:
‘(...) the great tasks of intelligence will remain. Information will 
still need to be collected. If the State is at risk – from whatever 
area – then some kind of defence is part of the contract between 
the governed and their government. (...) As long as there are 
nation states that compete and as long as those states harbour 
secrets, intelligence will remain a permanent fixture of foreign 
affairs, diplomacy and the relationship between states. Nations 
will always need to spy on each other. Intelligence will still be 
needed in the twenty-first century because human nature and 
human reactions will not change.’36
That said, the importance of MI has never changed, even up until today, as best 
illustrated by an excerpt from today’s US Manual on ‘Military Intelligence’. 
Here it is firmly stated that: 
15
‘The most important purpose of intelligence is to influence 
decisionmaking. Commanders must receive the intelligence, 
understand it (because it is tailored to the commander’s require-
ments), believe it, and act on it. Through this doctrinal concept, 
intelligence drives operations’.37
Developing MI: Through Steady Evolution or Occasional Revolu-
tions?
The title of this paper uses the term ‘evolution’. This is a deliberate choice, 
based on a particular view on MI that disputes the notion that any ‘revolutions’ 
have happened within intelligence since 1991. But as outlined in the previous 
paragraph, MI’s main aims and tasks have in principle not altered since the 
earliest stages of its existence. Yet despite this, even before the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall, elements in the US defence establishments, politicians and officers 
alike, began talking about ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs’ (RMI).38 Euphoric 
believers in the unlimited possibilities of new technology predicted ‘push-the-
button’-wars, where invisible bombers, smart weapons and remote controlled 
missiles guaranteed total, instant victories.39  The First Gulf War in 1991 initially 
seemed to fuel this vision of a ‘Television War’ with precision guided weapons 
penetrating windows of choice instead of gory ground battles.40 Nonetheless, it 
did not take long before it was realised that boots on the ground were required 
to gain some degree of control of the situation after the bombs had done the 
only thing bombs can do: kill and destroy.41
Visions like these had their days though, also within the field of intelligence. 
Some scholars even started to write about ‘Revolutions in Intelligence Affairs’. 
Among these was William N. Nolte, who went from initial support of this notion 
to later rejecting such ideas.42 Nolte concluded by acknowledging that there was 
nothing to justify the term ‘revolution’ in the development of MI. That said, as 
the shortcomings of mere air campaigns became obvious, the air went out of 
the RMA balloon. Scheuer states that RMA was ‘both a failure and a hoax’,43 
quoting Ralph Peters, who shares his views, because, as Peters has observed:
‘(...) The nature of warfare never changes, only its superficial 
manifestations. Joshua and David, Hector and Achilles would 
recognize the combat that our soldiers and Marines have waged 
in the alleys of Somalia and Iraq. The uniforms evolve, bronze 
gives way to titanium, arrows may be replaced by laser-guided 
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bombs, but the heart of the matter is still killing your enemies 
until any survivors surrender and do your will’. 44
Today the concept of ‘RMA’ is largely discarded; and old-fashioned soldiery, 
patrolling and fighting the enemy quarter by quarter if necessary, is again what 
meets soldiers. The ‘revolutions’ were, as observed by colonel Hammes, ‘(...) 
not revolutions at all. Rather they were the culmination of practical men seeking 
practical solutions to [the] tactical and operational problems of their day. (...)’.45 
Richard A. Best, Jr. takes a somewhat more moderate stance, acknowledging 
that the evolution of technology, including intelligence technology, has ‘(...) 
dramatically altered the relationship of the national intelligence agencies and the 
operating forces (...)’46 but he still uses the term ‘evolution’. So does Handel,47 
and it is in fact difficult today to find scholars or practitioners still prepared to 
defend the term ‘revolutions’ as a means of describing MI. This elucidates why 
this paper is deliberately called ‘The Evolution in Intelligence Support (...)’. 
This does not mean that the many technological inventions available to MI 
today are to be ignored, nor does this stance reduce the value of the Internet, 
new communication tools; and the full array of gadgets available to intelligence 
personnel today. But what it does mean is that Intelligence (MI included) should 
be viewed in a more sensible, down-to-earth way than both customers and lay-
men alike sometimes tend to do. MI has developed and evolved just like any 
other human activity – but never on a scale justifying the term ‘revolution’. Such 
views only serve to create confusion about the nature of MI, its possibilities and 
limitations, and if unrealistic perceptions are allowed to manifest themselves, 
new intelligence failures are inevitable. Admittedly, the post-Cold War era has 
indeed seen historically unprecedented deeds and acts, but for MI personnel, 
even this era has essentially been a continuous, arduous struggle to answer the 
same commander’s question: ‘what is behind the hill?’ 
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2) From Cold to Warmer Wars
The State of Intelligence at the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
In the concise yet comprehensive words of Peter Hennessy:
‘The Cold War kept a strange sort of peace for forty-five years. 
With enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other many times 
over, the United States and the Soviet Union glared at each 
other across an icy divide. Each guarded its own secrets and 
allowed the other to do the same. Given ‘mutually assured de-
struction’, regime change was not an option. Europe, East and 
West, froze, and stayed frozen’.48  
For 45 years, intelligence was – if not ‘easy’, so at least easily defined – univocal 
and manageable.49 As described precisely by Sir Richard Dearlove:
‘(...) We knew who our enemies were, we knew where they were 
and we knew about the threats they presented. If we did not 
know all of our enemies’ or opponents’ secrets, and we seldom 
did, we could at least be confident that the secrets were there to 
be discovered (...)’.50
For 45 years, Western Intelligence had ONE, major raison d’être: to prevent 
a surprise attack from the USSR by monitoring its capacities, capabilities 
and intentions, and hence enabling the West to meet any potential threat with 
Armed Forces capable of deterring any USSR military adventure.51 The CIA 
was created for this major mission, and constructed to meet this task.52 And for 
45 years, this was basically what Western Intelligence did, with US and a few 
Major Powers (mainly UK and France) powerful enough to have a secondary 
focus on China, North Korea and a few other regions.53 Billions of dollars 
spent, the vast amount of Western Intelligence expertise was directed solely 
towards these limited matters,54 and whole institutional identities55 were built 
on and around monitoring this sole, major foe.56 And then, suddenly, most of 
this became obsolete overnight as the former foe of the USSR disappeared and 
a friendly (sort of) Russia emerged.57
Adding to this is the fact that new threats and new enemies had gathered 
strength while few had noticed, building up their capacities to attack the 
West.58 But few knew, because radars, antennas and binoculars had mostly 
been directed towards the Soviet Union.59  In sum: the state of the Western IC 
when the USSR collapsed was shambolic.60 Western Intelligence in 1991 is 
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broadly described in reports and in the literature as having been incapable of 
dealing with the new threats from international terrorism; and poorly suited to 
support military operations in regions like the Middle East (Iraq), the former 
Yugoslavia,61 Afghanistan and others. The array of intelligence shortcomings 
and failures that characterised this era elucidates this point.
The IC agencies and organisations were also marked by rivalry and closed 
minds as to co-operation across agency borders, and accordingly close-minded 
as to the understanding of topics like foreign cultures beyond Eastern Europe 
and other, traditional points of focus. In sum, this encapsulates why Western 
Intelligence was unprepared when the first of several new wars and conflicts 
started in 1991. 
Intelligence Support in the First Gulf War 1991 
The ‘100-hour War’ between the US-led coalition and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 
1991 soon became highly debated, from political and military, as well as intelli-
gence points-of-view. Numerous books, articles and reports have questioned the 
wisdom in the sudden abruption of the campaign, before Hussein was defeated 
and with much of his elite combat power still intact. Michael Scheuer claims 
that the US won nothing and in fact that the only true result was a substantial 
fuelling of the growing hate among Islamists against the US and the West.62 
That being so, the overall view on the intelligence support to the military com-
manders is that it was close to being a complete failure. Not surprisingly, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (incidentally responsible for providing 
his commanders with the means required to win wars – intelligence included) 
highly prized the quality of the intelligence support to the Gulf War.63 General 
Norman Schwarzkopf leaves in his own autobiography little doubt about his 
own views: this was apparently the most impressive and convincing military 
campaign in history (incidentally led by him). As for the quality and perfor-
mance of the intelligence resources at his disposal, the General assures that 
‘(...) I was blessed with an intelligence staff whose work was so good that the 
military intelligence community in Washington usually let Central Command 
take the lead, seconding our assessments of the developments in the Middle 
East. (...)’.64 He goes on by insisting that ‘(...) our intelligence section – [was] 
already the best in the Middle East business (...)’.65
 
Nevertheless: his autobiography was already issued in 1992; shortly after 
the war ended and before the plethora of alternative narratives was published 
(including fellow generals’ views, more than touching upon elements of blame-
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gaming).66 This may serve as one explanation of this courteous treatment of 
the intelligence performance in Gulf War I, which substantially contrasts with 
public statements from the General himself soon after the war regarding certain 
shortcomings within the intelligence/MI field. Here, in a Congressional hearing, 
it became clear that the General saw the intelligence assessments he received 
as ‘belated and fudged’ to a level where, if he had relied on them to choose the 
right moment to attack, he would ‘(...) still be sitting over there waiting. (...)’.67 
It even appears that he was furious about Washington having thought that they 
were ‘(...) in a better position to judge battle damage assessments (than) the 
theatre commander (...)’.68  
Noted scholar Marc Lowenthal observes four shortcomings regarding intel-
ligence support to the troops in this war: 1) hedged and politicised analyses and 
estimates from Washington that were of little use to the Field Commanders; 2) 
differences in battle damage assessments between the two components; 3) ‘(...) 
an overall collection system more attuned to “national” tasks than to theatre 
requirements (...)’; and 4) ‘(...) the difficulties that service intelligence units 
had in sharing intelligence because of incompatible technical systems (...)’. 69 
Other scholars have observed even more severe faults and shortcomings in 
the intelligence support during the campaign. John Diamond is among the critics 
of the CIA’s (lack of) contributions to this war. Not only did the CIA refuse to 
become part of the joint intelligence efforts70  to ensure that Schwarzkopf was 
provided with one common view on intelligence matters, but their contribu-
tions comprised ‘voluminous and sometimes conflicting raw information’.71 
The CIA defended itself by stating, in their own words, that they ‘(...) resisted 
requests that its Iraqi analysts be fully incorporated into the Pentagon’s Joint 
Intelligence Center (JIC), because the CIA did not want to dilute its base of 
analytical expertise (...)’.72 The result, however, was that the military comman-
ders had to choose whether to listen to one or the other major intelligence key 
players – a less than desirable situation to any military commander, regardless 
of level. How can s/he make a qualified choice between two or more intelli-
gence agencies, offering differing views and analyses?   S/he basically can’t, 
and this demonstrates the level of failure involved when intelligence agencies 
fail to co-operate, leaving their main clients with frustration, rather than relief. 
Schwarzkopf later underlined that timely, relevant and useful intelligence should 
be provided to any military commander at his will.73  
Failures to make correct estimates are inevitable and understandable (on 
every topic and level), provided the collectors, analysts and briefers have all 
done their best. Less acceptable though are several of the shortcomings identified 
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above: 1) failure to prepare for plausible scenarios (including making sure that 
technological solutions are compatible); 2) policymakers interfering in strategic 
intelligence assessments; and 3) refusals of (or indeed artificial boundaries 
hampering) intelligence co-operation between agencies and organisations.74
That said, James Bamford has noticed that the Generals had two main 
intelligence assets: imagery and signals intelligence.75 But as Ernest R. May 
and Gregory F. Treverton (among others) reveal: even though Washington had 
access to real-time images of the enemy’s positions in Kuwait and Iraq, it took 
too long to get them to U.S. commanders in the field, to General Schwarzkopf’s 
uttermost frustration. 76 Instead, much of the operational intelligence was pro-
duced by MI units and staffs based on what they got of tactical information 
and intelligence.77
But from a MI point of view, SIGINT and IMINT may tell the commander 
where the enemy is, and to a certain extent what kind of forces and entrench-
ments s/he will face. That is, provided s/he gets it in time. But the commander 
will still know little (if anything) about the enemy’s plans and intentions, his 
moral and fighting spirit, provided good anti-SIGINT measures are taken, as 
Saddam did in this war. The US was practically without HUMINT in this war, 
leading to a failure to answer these fundamental questions when planning 
operations. Technology to ensure quick dissemination of intelligence was not 
at hand – resulting in commanders not knowing ‘what [was] behind the hill’. 
(What General Schwarzkopf DID know though, was – at any given time – 
‘what had been behind the hill’ – sadly enough, some 24 hours previously). The 
intelligence support for the coalition Commander in the first Gulf War – and 
subsequently to commanders on every level down through the ranks – was 
wanting.78 Good intelligence – even crucial intelligence for the commanders at 
the front existed – but only in Washington, basically due to a lack of adequate 
preparations.  
Intelligence Support in the Yugoslav Wars 1991 – 1995  
The first of several wars in Europe, following in the wake of the dissolution 
of the former Yugoslavia, broke out only a few months after the first Gulf War 
ended. Fighting started in Slovenia in June and in Croatia a few weeks later, 
after which the unrest spread to the rest of the Balkans.79 The response from 
the outside world in terms of active intervention was initially reluctant and 
haphazard.80 But when the media broadcasted more and more disturbing ima-
ges of hordes of refugees, ethnic genocide and outright concentration camps, 
the public call for an intervention grew in strength in Europe and the US. The 
United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) was deployed in 
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January, 1992,81 but soon proved ill-suited to prevent the fighting and killing.82 
Most notoriously, it proved unable to hinder the massacre of thousands of male 
Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995 by the Bosnian Serb forces.83
UNPROFOR, being the first attempt from the international society to inter-
fere, suffered from its own peculiar intelligence challenges from Day 1: being 
a UN mission, there was no intelligence available!84  It proved that UN had a 
culture and tradition of not even accepting the term ‘intelligence’ being used to 
describe information about the actors and conditions prevalent in any theatre 
of operations. Instead, this was labelled ‘information’ and has a long history 
of being disseminated openly and indiscriminately, with little attention paid to 
‘classifications’ if classified.85
Dr. Cees Wiebes has researched the Western Intelligence efforts before and 
during the Yugoslav Wars of 1991 – 1995 with a special emphasis on the fighting 
in Bosnia. He concluded his in-depth research project by stating that there was 
a blunt ‘absence of a good intelligence structure within UNPROFOR’,86 quo-
ting several force commanders and their deputies in that there was ‘no usable 
and timely intelligence at their disposal’.87 He sums up the war by stating that 
‘The Western intelligence and security services appeared to be insufficiently 
prepared for the war in Bosnia (...)’.88 
Dr. Wiebes’s overall conclusion leaves little doubt about the quality of 
Western intelligence support in the Yugoslav wars: 
‘(...)  in 1992 (...) Western intelligence services were confronted 
with an intelligence structure that was generally geared towards 
the ‘old’ threat from the East, and not suited to the Balkans. 
The Western intelligence services had built up a complex set of 
warning indicators that enabled them to detect this threat from 
the East in good time. The complete capacity for gathering 
intelligence was therefore concentrated on analysing a large-
scale conflict, which had little to do with the crisis in Yugoslavia 
(...)’.89
Leapfrogging to 1999, after several UN-, EU-, bi- and multinational talks, diplo-
macy and other efforts with little achievement, the Yugoslav wars reached a level 
that forced NATO to intervene. Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1199, 
NATO finally decided to go to war against Serbia due to Slobodan Milošević’s 
refusal to end his policy of forcing the Kosovo Albanians out of Kosovo. It took 
72 days of aerial bombardment to break Milošević’s determination to resist the 
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attacks. This was highly unexpected, and has in itself repeatedly been labelled 
as one of the ‘intelligence failures’ in the Yugoslav wars, as it was commonly 
expected that Serbia would surrender substantially quicker.90 
This happened ten years after the Berlin Wall had collapsed and after several 
wars fought by the Western Military, but General Wesley Clark still bluntly 
admits the West’s ill-preparedness for this war.91  This applies to every level, 
from political, strategic key players and national agendas, down to (non-existent) 
standardised military units, capacities and procedures. Only the US had the level 
of fighting capacity, as well as the SIGINT and IMINT, necessary to plan and 
fight a war like this. This also raises the question of how seriously the West, 
including the IC, had worked through these years to improve their Military and 
Intelligence capacities and capabilities. 
In the words of General Wesley Clark, summing up his experiences after 
having commanded the NATO war against Kosovo in 1999: 
‘Where the American role was dominant was in planning the 
air operation. The reason was basic. NATO itself had no intel-
ligence. NATO only received national intelligence and then 
disseminated it. It had no collection and little analytic capabili-
ties. Nor did NATO possess the means to conduct battle damage 
assessments. Other NATO member countries also lacked intel-
ligence collection and battle damage assessment capabilities. 
In fact, 99 percent of the target nominations came from U.S. 
intelligence sources. In this area, and in this area alone, due ba-
sically to lack of European capabilities, the operation assumed 
an excessively national character’.92
Like the UN, NATO has no intelligence capacity of its own – only what is of-
fered by its member states. The EU also lacks this capability, which was among 
the reasons why a ‘European’ solution proved impossible when fighting began 
and spread in the Balkans.93 The US also lacked sufficient language skills, 
HUMINT and cultural understanding of the region, but this is where certain 
European partners proved valuable. In the words of A. Denis Clift: ‘Too many 
U.S intelligence professionals spoke only [in] the tongues of past conflicts’.94 
The U.S. Army, primarily trained to fight Russian troops, found it particularly 
confusing to adjust to a ‘peace keeping’ (or ‘peace building’) operation like 
that in Kosovo. American infantry soldiers were indeed capable of fighting a 
war, but knew little about the people, cultures, religions, expectations and fe-
ars, possibilities and prohibitions prevalent in Kosovo, and hence strived hard 
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to determine what to do.95  This means that the commanders and the troops 
basically knew little about the enemy and the conditions prevalent where they 
were sent. The responsibility for providing this information lies in the hands 
of MI – and was hence another intelligence failure.
When analysing the role of MI in an aerial campaign like that of the Kosovo 
War, the differences between merely ‘winning a battle’ (bombing an opponent 
to the point of surrender) and ‘winning the war’ (convincing the population in 
the other state that your cause is the most righteous) becomes evident. In this 
war, MI succeeded to a certain degree in identifying targets of vital importance 
to the opponent, much of it built on IMINT.96 But MI prepared the troops poorly 
for what they could expect to meet once the weapons had fallen silent, and the 
stage of truly winning the war began. In fact, most of the Western Intelligence 
community was ill-prepared for these wars, and even though on European soil, 
lacked most of the basics with which to conduct intelligence operations in a 
theatre: language skills, cultural expertise, etc. 
This period also featured a rigid separation between the three levels of 
stately planning and execution. Strategic Intelligence related to their Political 
and Military counterparts on the same level, operational and tactical levels 
in Intelligence, and likewise with the Armed Forces. When asked about this 
observation, all four interviewees agreed. ‘William’ (UK) explains that, ‘In my 
experience, soldiers rarely interact with intelligence personnel from a natio-
nal/strategic level’. He supplies evidence by stating that, ‘The vast majority 
of work done in theatre by the British Intelligence Corps is at the tactical and 
operational level’.97
‘John’ (UK) has had the same experience, explaining that ‘Strategic intel-
ligence [officials] – (...) although present in some theatres, they only operate 
with high echelon headquarters – so most troops never see them’.98
Both Norwegian officers expressed similar views, ‘Michael’ (NOR) explai-
ning that: ‘I do share this view; my own experience is that the general flow 
of information was more a result of individual initiative at battalion level’.99 
Also, ‘Olav’ (NOR) agreed that ‘common soldiers, at least up until a few 
years ago, had little experience with intelligence personnel from a national/
strategic level’.100 
 ‘Michael’ (who served in Kosovo shortly after Serbia surrendered), replies: 
’During my service in the Balkans, there were little or no intelligence updates 
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available to the rank and file, save the S-3 daily briefing. The only strategic 
“intelligence” I ever recall having received was an open-source briefing based 
on academic sources prior to deployment. Once deployed, it was more or less 
a personal initiative on both the “push” and “pull” side of getting a sufficient 
situational picture from national sources’.101
When asked the same question in order to compare the situation in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces with UK experiences, ‘John’ (a member of the 
UK Defence Intelligence Community) replies that ‘In the Balkans most units 
continued to form their own tactical intelligence cells, although in some cases 
battle groups had intelligence corps personnel attached.’102
The statements from these experienced officers serve to confirm that as re-
cently as the late 1990’s, no real improvements had yet been achieved in order 
to bring about closer co-operation between the levels, and ensuring that troops 
on a tactical level could directly benefit from topic expertise prevalent at the 
national, strategic levels. NATO, having no intelligence on its own, relied on 
national intelligence provided by its member states – sadly though, this was 
often filtered according to national agendas and interests. Adding to this comes 
the problems of sharing between NATO- and non-NATO states in larger coali-
tions.103 Stated plainly: Western Intelligence was basically ill-prepared not only 
for the region in structural terms, but also for this kind of warfare, still locked as 
it was on the Cold War as a source of expertise, and as a shaper of its mindset. 
Intelligence Support Prior to 9/11 and in the Second Gulf War 
2003 
When it became clear that the terrorist attacks against the Pentagon and World 
Trade Centre on 11 September, 2001 really were attacks, directed against US 
targets on the US mainland, the Commander-In-Chief  (this time being the Pre-
sident of the US) asked the eternal Commanders’ questions about his enemy: 
‘who, where, why’ – and ‘what will he do now’. In other words, ‘what’s behind 
the hill?’ again. The orders were clear and short: ‘Find them – and fight them, 
wherever they are.’104 The CIA (and the rest of the US Intelligence Community) 
faced severe problems from the start, and as precisely observed by Ron Suskind: 
‘(...) Intelligence was the oxygen of the “war on terror”, with 
[the] CIA carrying burdens of collection, analysis, and opera-
tions beyond the capabilities of a seasoned, co-ordinated intel-
ligence authority ten times its size. The agency, meanwhile, was 
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neither seasoned in the complexities of fighting both terrorism 
and weapons proliferation, nor particularly well co-ordinated 
(...)’.105
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq contained as much 
information as the US Intelligence services could scrape together at this time,106 
some of it pointing in the direction of Saddam Hussein’s efforts to gain Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD). Even from the beginning of the planning process 
in the White House and the Pentagon, almost every piece of intelligence and 
information was basically building on ‘assumptions’ rather than verifiable facts 
and hard data.107 Hence, and with the benefit of hindsight, most of what went 
wrong did so from the start.108 Ali A. Allawi is among the most notable of the 
commentators on this process, underlining how much damage the US caused 
themselves (and Iraq) by their ‘obsession with finding WMD’,109 where there 
were none. 
It would go beyond the limits of this paper to further investigate the intel-
ligence failures leading up to the terror attacks on 9/11, since the focus is on 
MI support to military operations. It should be stated, however, that not only 
did a number of failures occur prior to 9/11, but even the process leading to the 
decision of to invade Iraq was cluttered with intelligence failures. The Butler 
report, though focusing on UK experiences, acknowledges that a string of errors 
were made. Among the most fatal were the co-operation between UK intel-
ligence agencies and police communities, both nationally and internationally 
(although the report indicates that this was the situation years ago, and that 
improvements are now seen).110 Furthermore, the absence of good HUMINT 
in Iraq,111 as well as the fact that ‘(...) the JIC’s warnings on the limitations of 
the intelligence underlying its judgements were not sufficiently clear in the 
dossier (...)’.112 
Stated plainly: UK intelligence saw that its primary customer, the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet, were steering towards war, and the JIC knew (as later 
admitted)113 that their intelligence was given a role and function it shouldn’t 
have had due to the poor quality of the indicators supporting the conclusions 
drawn by the PM. Yet the war was allowed to go ahead, which raises questions 
about the level of integrity among those witnessing this apparent misuse of 
intelligence, without raising their voices.114
The state of the intelligence support offered to the commanders of this war, 
when it started, was just as faulty as the process leading up to it. One of the 
sharpest critics was Ambassador Bremer, who complained in his memoirs about 
26
the overall ‘lack of precise intelligence on the nature of the enemy’.115 Bremer 
shares Allawi’s frustration over Washington’s obsession with finding evidence 
of WMDs, even to a level where lack of intelligence about the real enemy and 
the overall situation in the region started to cost US troops’ lives. 116  Bremer 
even outlines in substantial detail the level of rivalry and lack of co-operation 
between the different intelligence assets present in the theatre.117
All of this led him to a level of frustration where he demanded (on the basis 
of local intelligence advice) that an ‘All-Source, All-Agency Intelligence Cell’ 
be formed,118 to ensure that the agencies really cooperated, as well as to reach 
a state where ONE voice spoke on behalf of the present IC. The overall judge-
ment among scholars and commentators alike is that this war was based on an 
intelligence failure, and carried out without the most basic intelligence support 
for the commanders on the ground – not to mention the lack of preparation for 
the soldiers for the situation they were to meet.
Professor Steven K. O’Hern served in Iraq in 2005 as the director of the 
Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate, and he has delivered fierce criticism 
on the level of MI, even years after the initial stages of the war were over. He 
first stated that ‘(...) The Unites States military was not built to fight an insur-
gency, but has adapted new techniques and relearned forgotten lessons from 
past wars. The intelligence system that supports our military, however, has not 
[been] adapted (...). The chief lesson is that our military’s intelligence system 
does not work well for fighting an insurgency (...)’.119 O’Hern sums up his major 
disappointments after his tour in Iraq as follows:
‘Improvements in intelligence operations can be a large part of 
the solution for our problem of facing an insurgency, a type of 
war the United States historically does not like to fight. Im-
proved intelligence can reduce casualties, shorten wars, and 
give our leaders more flexibility in our nation’s foreign rela-
tions. But there are many roadblocks in this path. Our intel-
ligence operations are bureaucratic and severely hampered by 
turf wars. Nearly anyone who has worked in intelligence will 
admit that the “stovepipes” caused by a lack of co-operation 
among military units and intelligence agencies are common and 
hurtful. But the general public doesn’t understand how bad it 
is. Human intelligence is the most valuable intelligence tool we 
have against an insurgency. But it is poorly managed, it takes a 
back seat to the military’s fascination with technology, and it is 
ground zero for turf battles’.120
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Provided O’Hern is right, the state of US MI is (or at least was, when he served 
in the theatre) in remarkably bad shape. But held up against the vast majority 
of other books, reports and statements from scholars and commentators, his 
views corroborate the overall criticism well. In sum, the conclusion is that the 
intelligence support to the commanders in the Second Gulf War had improved 
little since the First Gulf War, and little has improved even after the initial stages 
of the war. The same basic problems experienced in 1991 remained unsolved 
in 2003: the highest echelons in the US directed intelligence resources in the 
theatre from afar, even to a level where the commander on the ground was 
stripped of his intelligence assets to serve political purposes, rather than the 
protection of the troops on the ground.
The absence of good HUMINT was, as demonstrated, crucial. This goes back 
to before 9/11, prior to the attack on Iraq, and during the war. Both of the major 
Commissions following the war have concluded that the absence of sufficient 
HUMINT was ‘directly responsible in a direct way for these disasters’.121 Again 
it should be noted that without HUMINT, few possibilities remain to keep track 
of what people really think and feel about matters of vital importance to any 
decision maker, planner or commander. 
 
Lessons Learned for Intelligence After a Decade of Post-Cold 
War Wars
Ten years after the dawn of the Post-Cold War era, it was broadly realised that 
Western intelligence was poorly prepared to meet post-Cold War challenges, 
and the 9/11 attack may be seen as the climax of ten years of repeated intelli-
gence failures and shortcomings. As demonstrated in this chapter: even though 
the fundamental and institutional shortcomings were clear from the beginning, 
Western intelligence was slow at identifying exactly what needed to be done, 
and subsequently adapting with new shapes, strategies and techniques. 
This elucidates that the most important lesson learned was that intelligence 
agencies really were in pressing need of restructuring and rethinking their 
relevance, and asking the classical questions regarding the need for their exis-
tence: what, why and how. When these questions are answered, any agency or 
service would know what they were expected to achieve, why their existence 
is important, and finally, how improvements and changes should be adapted.
The major intelligence shortcomings may be listed as follows, and they all 
apply to a degree to intelligence in general, as well as to MI:
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• An insufficient level of co-operation between different intelligence agencies 
and organisations;
• An insufficient level of co-operation between intelligence agencies and 
other organisations: police and law enforcement, civilian resource pools of 
expertise like universities, think-tanks, NGOs, and others;122
• A severe lack of expertise on a broad range of vital topics; especially foreign 
cultures and religions and hence on history, social science, social anthropo-
logy etc.;
• A severe lack of linguistic skills on even the most important languages to 
Western Intelligence today: Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Chinese, Korean etc.;
• Widespread groupthink, mirror imaging, and generally too few that are able 
to think ‘out-of-the-box’. In short: a lack of both human format and profes-
sional integrity.              
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3) From Old to New Wars
Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 – New Terrorism, New Quagmires
Ernest R. May has summed up Western Intelligence’s major post-Cold War 
challenges, including its lack of ability (at least initially) to adapt and to im-
prove as follows:
‘Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies faced 
a very different set of tests. Not only were they challenged to 
pass judgements on subjects other than the strategic nuclear 
threat from a rival superpower; they found themselves having to 
answer to a larger and more varied group of customers within 
the “policy community” and to do so during a period of dizzy-
ing technological change. (...) This changed with the Gulf War 
of 1991. From the beginning of time, operational military com-
manders have wanted to know what was “on the other side of 
the hill”. Improvements in capacity to collect imagery from sat-
ellites, combined with improvements in communication between 
collectors of imagery and collectors of signals intelligence, 
made it technically possible by 1991 for the U.S. intelligence 
community to put together actual pictures of the enemy facing 
U.S. forces opposite Kuwait. The problem was that they could 
assemble these pictures in Washington but not get them quickly 
to U.S. commanders in the field (...)’.123
What followed has been labelled a new ‘militarisation of intelligence’,124  alt-
hough the renewed focus was on Support to Military Operations (SMO), which 
had already started under the Clinton administration.125 Gregory Treverton has 
observed a vital aspect of this change of priority: 
‘In an important sense, the renewed emphasis on SMO repre-
sents a movement toward the past; it marks a return to intel-
ligence as primarily tactical after the long Cold War interlude 
when intelligence was preoccupied with the strategic impera-
tive, understanding the Soviet threat. The ultimate issue SMO 
raises is one of mission and priority: should intelligence pri-
marily support military planning and operations? (...)’.126
He also underlines that ‘(...) For most of history, when there has been intel-
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ligence, its purpose has been supporting war fighters (...).’127 That said, lacking 
timely, relevant and reliable intelligence as precariously as General Schwarzkopf 
and his commanders did in 1991,128 US SMO had by then clearly not come far 
in improving their abilities. As demonstrated in the two previous chapters of 
this paper, neither had they improved much when wars broke out in the Bal-
kans shortly thereafter. Apparently, it was not until after the Second Gulf War 
(the US still shaken by the intelligence failures preceding 9/11), that both US 
Intelligence and Western Intelligence in general, seemed to undertake some 
serious measurements to think in new terms on SMO/MI. 
In the words of ‘Olav’, who served in Iraq/Kuwait immediately after the 
First Gulf War: ‘It is my experience that the importance of a more systematic 
intelligence support to military operations was fully realized first after 9/11. 
Before my last international assignment to another theatre in 2008/2009, this 
had improved significantly. This time, topic experts from the Norwegian Intelli-
gence Service briefed us on important matters on the conflict and region, and the 
information provided from them proved to be most useful when we deployed’.129 
‘Michael’, another Norwegian Military Officer, share these views, stating 
that: ‘As I re-enlisted in 1999, my personal opinion is that the information flow 
gradually got better around 2003 in respect to being fed by national intelligence 
assets’.130
Statements from officers on the ground like these begs the question of ‘which 
major efforts were made then, between the Clinton administration and the Se-
cond Gulf War, in order to improve SMO?’ That said, and bearing in mind that 
there seems to have been limited improvement within the field of MI/SMO, 
another question is: ‘why did it take so long to achieve significant improve-
ments?’ Seymour Hersh is among the fiercest critics of US efforts to improve 
its intelligence, underlining that the CIA had already created its ‘Counter Ter-
rorism Center’ in 1986, after a ‘(...) wave of international bombings, airplane 
hijackings, and kidnappings. The idea was to bring together experts from every 
American police agency, including the Secret Service, into a “fusion center”, 
which would co-ordinate intelligence data on terrorism. (...)’.131 But neverthe-
less, Hersh claims that this was little more than a ‘show-off’, achieving little 
and really not improving the capacity to meet the fundamental challenges.
Another US initiative was named the Defense HUMINT Service. According 
to Frederick P. Hitz, this organisation was ‘(...) created in 1993 after the 1991 
Gulf War to organize the military’s effort to gather tactical intelligence around 
the battlefield for the purposes of aiding and protecting U.S. forces fighting 
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abroad (...)’.132 Not much is known about the usefulness of this (and other) 
attempts to improve SMO, but given the level and amount of criticism on the 
overall lack of US HUMINT demonstrated in this paper, there is little reason 
to believe that much was accomplished. Author James Risen is very reluctant 
in this regard, simply stating that it ‘(...) had for years done some clandestine 
intelligence work, but it had never been involved in the kind of high-risk ope-
rations that Rumsfeld had in mind for the secret units that he created (...)’.133 
Consequently, even this initiative bears the marks of a half-hearted construction, 
hinting to the need to demonstrate good will rather than genuine ability.
Yet another attempt to improve US intelligence was seen in December 
1993, when the US launched their ‘Defence Counter-proliferation Initiative’ 
(DCPI). The aim was to ‘strengthening prevention’ and ‘protecting US inter-
ests’,134 but a roaring silence surrounded the relevance and usefulness of this 
initiative. And other attempts followed, so that the CIA saw in the following 
years an array of restructuring initiatives, among these the establishment of a 
special unit inside its Counterterrorist Center in 1996 to follow bin Laden and 
Al Qaeda. 135  This was the first time ever that a CIA station targeted a person 
rather than a country, and in an attempt to better co-ordinate itself, it drew its 
members from both the CIA and FBI.136 Building on these experiences, the US 
opened the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2005. It is staffed with 
analysts from the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency and others, working 
together on common tasks. Behind it all lays the realisation that there really is 
a need to better share intelligence. This stance can hardly be countered: unless 
information and intelligence is distributed to those who need it, it is useless. But 
bearing in mind that after 9/11, President Bush described the failure to prevent 
the 9/11 hijackers as being ‘systemic’,137 there are good reasons to assume that 
decades of suspicion and contempt towards ‘rivalling’ agencies had (and has) 
lived on. Author Ronald Kessler is remarkably positive, especially since few 
other independent scholars and authors seem to share his trust in them.138  Ron 
Suskind delivers a blow to the optimism of the likes of Kessler, when quoting 
Donald Rumsfeld’s contempt for the CIA. Rumsfeld noticed the success of the 
CIA-led, ad-hoc teams (involving Special Forces and a number of other topic 
experts) deployed to Afghanistan in 2001. Rather than rejoicing in their success, 
he stated that ‘every CIA success is a DoD failure’ – and that he never again 
wanted the ‘US Army to arrive somewhere and meet the CIA on the ground’.139 
With attitudes like this, ‘systemic’ could indeed describe the level of rivalry 
in-built in the old structures. 
The CIA was, as touched upon in the previous paragraph, thrown back in 
business again soon after 9/11, following President Bush’s order to hunt the 
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culprits behind 9/11. As described by A. Denis Clift: ‘(...) Several CIA teams 
were formed. Each included paramilitary veterans, officers with Farsi and Dari 
language skills, counter terrorists, and communicators (...)’.140 These teams seem 
to have been the greatest success so far in the US effort to find better ways of 
co-operating, and to ensuring better intelligence support to operations. 
Mindsets do not change rapidly, and hence psychological factors have ham-
pered intelligence improvements since 1991. A number of efforts have been 
made to meet the new challenges, and several new units and staffs have been 
created, but these have been half-hearted efforts overall, and have achieved little. 
One team, or rather one type of intelligence team, has proved valuable 
though, being multi-skilled and multi-agency in composition. The CIA created 
a number of special teams to penetrate Afghanistan for the purpose of hunting 
down bin Laden and Al Qaeda, as well as preparing the ground for the US 
military presence. These hand-picked units, both combatant and ‘soft’ when 
possible, form a striking contrast to other attempts to meet the shortcomings in 
US intelligence, post-Cold War. What this could mean for MI as a whole will 
be the core subject for the remaining part of this paper.
Back to the Start? Rediscovering the Benefits of the World War II 
Spirit
SAS Veteran Barry Davies offers a useful observation: ‘(...) In many ways, the 
terrorist organisations themselves are responsible for the growth and main-
tenance of the counterterrorist industry. In direct response to a spate of hijackings 
and the slaughter at the 1972 Munich Olympics, government ministers at the 
1973 G7 talks recommended the formation of counter-terrorist units.(...)’.141 
Counterterrorist teams may indeed serve as an example of ‘Task-oriented 
Multiple Skills Units’, involving every capability needed, from shooters to 
dedicated (integrated) intelligence sections.142 But this was nothing new to 
the 1970s. Most of today’s Western intelligence-, security-, and (later to be 
known as) counterterrorist agencies were established shortly before, or during 
the Second World War, and like the emerging counterterrorist organisations in 
the 1970s mentioned above: as a direct response to the needs of that time.143 
Intelligence collection often involves operations on occupied territory, meaning 
that the operators need to undergo military training, enabling them to defend 
themselves if necessary. 
The distinction between intelligence and what are known as Special Forces 
today was often blurred during WW II, as seen with the UK Special Operations 
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Executives (SOE), Norwegian XU, and the US Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), founded in 1942,144 and later transformed partly into the CIA, but also 
partly into US Special Forces (Green Berets).145 Characteristically, these were 
all units where combat soldiers, ‘doers’, intelligence collectors and ‘thinkers’ 
(analysts), all served in the same unit. Organisations like these focused on 
a few fundamental questions when considering new members of the group. 
These would most likely include whether the candidate was trustworthy, and 
whether he or she was skilled in one or more useful topics to the missions and 
operations carried out by the group. Since security is of outmost importance to 
clandestine groups like this, the group most probably would have considered 
whether the candidate had the overall stamina to carry out such work, ranging 
from ‘are you tough enough?’ to ‘are you able to blend in, without drawing 
unnecessary attention to yourself?’. Provided that these (and probably a few 
more) requirements were met, new candidates could hope to join the group. 
That said, the British Secret Intelligence Service had already set up its own 
guerrilla warfare department in 1938 for (among other purposes) sabotage. This 
department later evolved into the ‘hell-raising’ Special Operations Executive, 
created to support resistance on occupied territory, and sabotage and espionage/
intelligence collection behind enemy lines.146 Important to note here is that we 
again see a plethora of skills and capacities in the same units, intelligence per-
sonnel and soldiers alike – and a mixture of civilian and military backgrounds. 
Even though the significance of this lack of prejudice as to the acceptance of 
candidates was fully seen later, some of the world’s best elite units today were 
built on these initiatives from Churchill to ‘raise hell by thinking in new, unli-
mited, and imaginative’ ways: the SAS, the SBS and others.147
Decades later, the same happened again in the US when they created their 
‘Delta Force’ in 1977 on the basis of their experiences in the Vietnam War. The 
US had by then recognised a severe need for a ‘SAS’-style capacity for them-
selves: deep penetration raids, hostage/POW rescues, sabotage, and intelligence 
gathering for large operations.148 However, units like Delta Force are (like any 
military unit) totally dependent on timely, relevant and reliable intelligence on 
the ground. After the disastrous US attempt to rescue their hostages from Iran 
in 1980, merely resulting in a humiliating stumbling over their own feet in the 
desert, the US realised (again) that without sufficient SMO, little could be done. 
Their answer was (again) to create new (ultra-) secret elite units – among them, 
a SOF organisation simply named ‘The Activity’ – yet another all-encompassing, 
multi-skilled SOF-and-intelligence-based special team.149 Peter Harclerode 
reveals that another ‘(...) highly secret intelligence unit [...] formed to support 
counter-terrorist operations world-wide.(...)’ was created in the early 1980s.150 
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This unit was called the ‘Intelligence Support Activity’ (ISA), and its role was 
to ‘infiltrate, provide intelligence and support for other US counter-terrorist 
forces’ in any operation to follow.151 Given the topic of this paper, is it impor-
tant to notice that some two-thirds had a SOF-background, while the rest were 
intelligence personnel (especially HUMINT and SIGINT).152 Open sources 
confirm the existence of a number of units of this character through the years, 
among them ‘Task Force 88’, an elite unit formed to fight Saddam Hussein in 
2003. This particular unit was based on the SAS, and like those described in 
this paragraph it brought together the same core elements as the others: intel-
ligence operators and analysts, as well as SOF capacities.153
The UK seems to have relied more on her existing, well-established units 
like the SAS, SBS, and the Royal Marines than following in the footsteps of 
the US – the above-mentioned Task Force being a rare example of the oppo-
site. But there are a few other examples, stemming from perceived needs to 
combine every asset available to meet a complex situation – and a less than 
traditional foe. Expert and author Tony Geraghty has observed that the Irish 
war and the 1972 Munich massacre sparked a ‘(...) mutation in the Army. The 
SAS responded to Munich by creating a Counter Revolutionary Warfare cell. 
In Ireland, (...) the conventional “Green Army” (...) invented the Military Re-
connaissance Force (...)’. 154 This unit was followed by a new team known by 
several names, among them ‘14 intelligence company’ and/or “The Dets”.155 
To them, a crucial success factor was to achieve the closest cooperation pos-
sible between all levels of intelligence, both military and civilian, as well as 
Police and any Armed Forces unit present at any given time. Their main focus 
was simple: combating terrorism in Northern Ireland – utilising the means and 
methods available to achieve this. And like the units described above, this unit 
also collected their own intelligence, analysed it and disseminated intelligence 
to others.156 But with peace (sort of) and the absence of a PIRA to fight, this unit 
also adapted to new challenges. In 2004, and in the words of Tony Geraghty, 
‘what had started life in Northern Ireland as 14 Intelligence Company became 
the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (...).157 Among their main tasks was to 
follow Islamist fundamentalists. Several other units were created in the years 
to follow, and the last that was publicly known is the ‘Brigade Reconnaissance 
Force’, created in 2009.158
James Risen has described how strongly Rumsfeld opposed the CIA-led 
operations taking place in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11, and subsequ-
ently ‘(...) pushing for more aggressive activities by U.S. Special Forces and 
the even more secretive and elite special operations teams in the Joint Special 
Operations Command. In Afghanistan, CIA paramilitary personnel had joined 
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with special forces and special operations units to marry intelligence to muscle 
and firepower (...)’.159
The ‘marriage between intelligence and muscle-and-firepower’ that Risen 
describes is a brilliant summary of the main factors found prevalent in the major 
successes of intelligence support to military operations, whether the unit’s main 
mission is to supply the commanders with intelligence directly, or to provide 
intelligence to higher echelons outside the Operational Theatre. Tony Geraghty 
concludes that the most important lesson learned after the unorthodox CIA-lead 
operations in Afghanistan 2001 were as follows: ‘(...) At the military level, the 
symbiosis of CIA paramilitary and intelligence combined with Special Opera-
tions Forces was the future war-fighting model (...)’.160
Also Henry A. Crumpton has observed the same success, and in his own 
words: 
‘The formula for the application of power depended upon 
binary elements, CIA officers, and U.S Special Forces, which 
together created the glue that held the operation together. The 
CIA’s paramilitary officers, with their deep knowledge of special 
operations and intelligence, provided the most adhesive element 
of this mixture. This was especially critical because there was 
no previous planning or training; the blended glue emerged 
from professionalism rooted in a sense of collective mission and 
personal relationships built on mutual respect. The result was a 
war of supreme coordination between Afghan tribal allies and 
U.S. airpower. The CIA delivered the HUMINT and the Afghan 
tribal armies. The Special Forces brought tactical skills and 
linked the ground to the air. Sensors and shooters emerged, 
producing teams that delivered uniquely accurate and awesome 
force.’161
Extreme situations and needs tend to motivate unconventional thoughts and 
solutions. There is a long history in both peace and wartime of forming new, 
often unconventional teams and units to combat an unconventional foe. When 
the stakes are high enough, it seems easier to think in terms of ‘what could work’ 
rather than ‘who-shall-have-the-honour-of-doing-whatever-may-work’. Thus, 
since before WW II, a number of multi-skilled, multi-sourced, military-civilian 
units have been formed in order to combat the most difficult of opponents – and 
mostly with intelligence personnel incorporated. Paradoxically enough, these 
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lessons-learned seem to be forgotten quite soon after the same units have done 
their job, and contributed heavily to the surrender of the foe.
National Intelligence Support Teams: Current Culmination and 
Future Role Model
The rediscovery of WW II’s lessons of looking for skills, guts and expertise, 
and not having the luxury of fighting each other as long as there are enemies to 
fight, proved successful. The concept is very simple and logical: bring together 
intelligence operators, analysts, collectors and topical experts from both civilian 
and military intelligence services, and even from the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels. National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) is described in one 
of the few articles existing on this subject as follows:
‘(...) With this increased reliance on intelligence, intelligence 
officers at the theatre and tactical levels have looked to the na-
tional IC for support to fill the commander’s information short-
falls. Consequently, the IC has sought to provide support to the 
tactical commander with historically unprecedented vigour. One 
means of providing timely, tailored national intelligence support 
to deployed forces is through a NIST. (...) Teams are specifi-
cally configured to meet the needs of the deployed commander 
(...). A NIST is able to provide unique intelligence support to a 
JTF commander in several ways. First, and most frequently, the 
NIST provides a “reach-back” to national IC agencies and a 
thorough knowledge of each agency’s resources and capabili-
ties that normally does not exist at the JTF level (...). A second 
unique aspect of a NIST’s intelligence support is that it provides 
a threat warning capacity to the JTF and enhances the com-
mander’s overall force protection capability (...). Third, a NIST 
offers several products from each of its parent agencies that 
may otherwise be unavailable to a JTF. These products may 
carry classifications that no JTF communications systems are 
cleared to handle, but that a NIST is able to disseminate via its 
agency-only systems (...). Fourth, a NIST enables a JTF com-
mander to submit RFIs that require an answer from the national 
IC within 24 hours or less (...)’.162
Bearing in mind that this article excerpt describes US views, many nations 
have formed and deployed NISTs to a number of military operational theatres 
since the 1990s. Details may wary, but the core concept remains. NISTs are the 
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culmination of the need to improve intelligence support to military operations. 
When asked about his views on how SMO could best improve, John’s (UK) 
response, interestingly enough, sums up the core of the ideas behind the new, 
improved intelligence teams described in the previous paragraph:
 
‘Dissemination, dissemination, dissemination! Sharing and 
managing information – creating platforms where information 
can easily be accessed (including OSINT) or pulled, rather than 
pushed – but also ensuring that information overload does not 
take place. Furthermore: strategic reach back – national level 
analytical and collection assets providing real-time support to 
expeditionary operations. And finally: briefings and demonstra-
tion of intelligence capabilities to low-level formations, not just 
senior figures. Ensure that they know how they can be of value 
to them, how to use them and what they need to do to get the 
best out of them’.163
‘Michael’ (NOR) adds that: ‘What needs improvement is the involvement of 
strategic intelligence to the rank and file, but this may even reflect the lack of 
strategic overview at higher levels as well – if there is one at all. The demys-
tifying of intelligence may perhaps have a relation to the democratisation of 
information through new information technology, and in this respect it is useful 
to create a broader understanding of the mission the soldiers do themselves. 
We still have a long way to go here, primarily on the staff level. There are a 
couple of cold war relics still setting their mark on the information flow, and 
this may in turn even endanger troop morale in the long run’.164
Another article, this one being found in the Norwegian Army’s publication 
‘HÆRFRA’, dating from May 2005, and named, ‘The Norwegian Intelligence 
Service Saved Lives’, describes Norwegian experiences. Although the article 
is written by an army journalist and not by the Norwegian Intelligence Service 
(NIS), it still provides the reader with some interesting information about, as 
well as views upon, the importance of the concept behind units like the Nor-
wegian NIST. According to the article in question,165 the Norwegian NIST is a 
generic concept, meaning that some functions and capacities to be found in one 
specific mission may be replaced by some others in the next mission. Hence, 
a NIST may consist of management, intelligence collectors, linguists, and a 
variety of intelligence specialists, capacities and capabilities from any ‘INT’. 
The Commanding Officer (CO) of a Norwegian NIST (this particular NIST 
served in Iraq) is interviewed in the article, and he underlines how important, 
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but also how difficult it is, to find and to recruit well-suited candidates for a 
service as special as this. The basic requirement is a high level of experience, 
one or another sought-after specialist competence, as well as certain personal 
skills. Not only does every member need to be a well-educated and experienced 
professional, for example a graduate in social science, he or she also needs to 
be a highly trained soldier as well. The CO describes his own main task as be-
ing to co-ordinate the collection and analysis of information and turn this into 
products of intelligence relevance. According to the CO, fundamental to the 
quality of their work was both the co-operation with the multinational intel-
ligence community in the theatre, but also with the Norwegian Intelligence 
Service Headquarters in Norway. 
The CO further states that the NIST took an active part in training and edu-
cating the troops on the ground, based on their expertise on the region, culture, 
religion, symbols and holy days, rites and rituals, ethnicities, Iraqi security units 
and police, as well as politics. They also trained and informed the soldiers on 
the weapons, ammunition and explosives used against the Norwegian troops, 
all for the purpose of preparing the troops for any vital challenge likely to be 
faced as part of their duties in Iraq. 
When confronted by the common notion that intelligence personnel are 
traditionally far less open than seen in this interview, the CO simply states 
that the presence of Norwegian Intelligence wherever Norway deploys troops 
is regulated by domestic laws, and thus commonly known in Norway. Still: 
exactly how they do their job is classified. 
The Norwegian Company Commander, who received warnings and was 
constantly briefed by the NIST is also cited, being most grateful for this aid. He 
is very clear when attributing the absence of fatal incidents in this contingent 
to the ‘aid provided by the Norwegian NIST’.166
The uniqueness of the information derived from this rare article lays in 
the fact that the Norwegian NIST-concept apparently (according to the officer 
interviewed), is three-fold. Firstly, the Norwegian NISTs have succeeded in 
bringing together personnel from both military and civilian fields of expertise. 
Secondly, its expertise ranges from the strategic to the tactical level, and thirdly, 
they are directly interacting with personnel, troops and units over the same 
range of levels: from the strategic to the tactical. A fourth characteristic could 
be added: all of this implies a wide range of allied (international) intelligence 
co-operation and sharing.
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So What is Achieved – What Works – and Where Should MI Go 
From Here?
This paper started by exploring MI’s roots and roles and significance and limi-
tations, in order to clarify the true nature of the topic being analysed. Succes-
sively, this paper has demonstrated how ill-prepared Western Intelligence was 
at the onset of the post-Cold War era. In short: backwardly and single-minded 
in aims and focus, narrow and limited in skills and capacities, and downright 
arrogant while permitting prestige to come before the common good. 
MI was broadly regarded as an anachronism at the dawn of the post-Cold 
War era; hence states began downsizing their intelligence capacities. This 
further weakened the already disarrayed agencies, a significant factor behind the 
faulty contributions from US intelligence to the Military Commanders before 
and during the First Gulf War, in 1991. As demonstrated, this reached a level 
forcing the US Commander of the Coalition against Hussein to insist on having 
one voice and one person to deal with, responsible for the sum of intelligence 
available in the theatre, rather than dealing with the plethora of US (and other) 
intelligence units, agencies and organisations operating in the region. This 
paper has illustrated why this may be regarded as the ‘birth’ of a new level of 
intelligence support to military commanders, through the creation of units like 
the National Intelligence Support Teams. By compiling and analysing publi-
cly available information on these units, this paper has demonstrated that the 
NIST concept is seemingly where Military Intelligence has come furthest in the 
improvement of skills, capacities and inter-agency intelligence co-operation. 
Finally, this paper will state that the NIST teams may serve as a role model 
for the overall Intelligence Community, being teams of the best, handpicked 
topic experts available anywhere, professionals of integrity and dedication, fully 
focusing on MIs core task, being ‘how can we best support commanders with 
timely, relevant and reliable intelligence?’ Operating from that focus, rather 
than narrow-minded rivalry and barren bureaucracy, intelligence may indeed 
reach the utmost of its abilities. What it takes is professionalism, dedication, 
guts and above all: integrity. After all, intelligence without integrity is either 
prostitution – or science fiction.
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Appendix B: Abbreviations and terms
This paper analyses intelligence, both generically – meaning ‘information 
collected’, ‘analysed (processed) information’ and similar (and so spelt with a 
lower-case ‘i’), and more specifically, meaning Intelligence Agencies (in which 
case spelt with a capitol ‘I’). In the latter meaning, the preferred terms are either 
the ‘Intelligence Community’ (IC), meaning ‘Western intelligence agencies, 
organisations and units’,167 or ‘Western Intelligence’ (WI), meaning the same. 
GMI General Military Intelligence
IC  Intelligence Community
MI Military Intelligence
NIC National Intelligence Cell
NIST  National Intelligence Support Team
SAS Special Air Service
SBS Special Boat Service
SMO Support to Military Operations
SOF Special Operations Forces (Special Forces)
WI Western Intelligence
Intelligence: Observing that there is still no commonly agreed or accepted 
definition of the term ‘intelligence’ today among scholars, practitioners and 
topic writers, this author finds the definition (or rather description) used in the 
Butler Report to be quite comprehensive:
‘(...) Information acquired against the wishes and (generally) without the 
knowledge of its originators or possessors is processed by collation with other 
material, validation, analysis and assessments and finally disseminated as 
‘intelligence’.(...)’168
Military Intelligence (MI): I have found the broad and all-encompassing 
definition provided by the US Army (though labelled General Military Intel-
ligence (GMI)) to be useful:
‘(...) intelligence concerning military capabilities of foreign 
countries or organizations or topics affecting potential (...) mili-
tary operations relating to armed forces capabilities, including 
OB, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other 
factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness and area 
and terrain intelligence. (...)’169 
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National Intelligence Cell (NIC): A generic term for any number of intelligence 
analysts/operators deployed to a multinational military operation, preferably 
configured as an all-source intelligence cell with experts from a range of intel-
ligence disciplines, but may consist of just one or two.170 Unlike NISTs, who 
primarily focus on the military commander and his/her needs, NICs tend to 
function more like extended arms for the domestic, national intelligence services 
contributing to a multinational military operation.
National Intelligence Support Team: Although the responsibility to compose, 
deploy and command NISTs may vary from one state to another, they are cha-
racterised by being all-source intelligence analysts/operators ‘(...), specifically 
configured to meet the needs of the deployed commander. (..)’171 NISTs are 
generally the responsibility of a state’s national, strategic intelligence service, 
rather than its armed forces, although its members may come from any armed 
service, being experts in any given intelligence topic or matter, e.g., scholars, 
academics, police officers, SOF, etc. 
Operational Intelligence: ‘Intelligence required for the planning and conduct 
of campaigns at the operational level’.172 More specifically, it is the intelligence 
required for the planning, execution and support of campaigns and operations 
within a Joint Operations Area (JOA) by a Joint Headquarters (...).173
Strategic Intelligence: ‘Intelligence required for the formation of policy, 
military planning and the provision of indications and warning, at the national 
and/or international levels’.174 This is the highest level of intelligence derived 
from information gathered over the widest possible area in response to requi-
rements placed by national and international military, diplomatic, political and 
economic matters’.175
Tactical Intelligence: ‘Intelligence required for the planning and execution of 
operations at the tactical level’.176 Intelligence used from the level of formation 
headquarters downwards which is produced within the formation’s area.’177
HUMINT: Human Intelligence. ‘A category of intelligence collected and 
provided by human sources’.178
SIGINT: Signal Intelligence. ‘Intelligence derived from the interception of 
communications (COMINT) and other electronic (ELINT) transmissions’.179
51
IMINT: Imagery Intelligence. ‘Intelligence derived from imagery acquired 
from sensors which can be ground-based, seaborne or carried by air or space 
platforms’.180
OSINT: Open Source Intelligence. ‘Intelligence derived from publicly av-
ailable information, as well as other unclassified information that has limited 
public distribution or access’.181
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For 45 years, Western Intelligence had ONE, major raison d’être: to prevent a surprise attack from 
the USSR by monitoring its capacities, capabilities and intentions, and hence enabling the West to 
meet any potential threat with Armed Forces capable of deterring any USSR military adventure. 
The major Western Intelligence agencies were created for this major mission, and constructed 
to meet this task – and for 45 years, this was basically what Western Intelligence did. But in 1991, 
most of this became obsolete overnight with the collapse of the USSR. Meanwhile, new threats 
and new enemies had gathered strength while few had noticed, building up their capacities to at-
tack the West – culminating in the terror attacks upon the US on September 11. 2001. Few saw this 
coming, because radars, antennas and binoculars had mostly been directed towards the Soviet 
Union.  
Since 1991, the West has been engaged in a number of wars and conflicts – and it still is. This 
paper will demonstrate that Western Intelligence was poorly suited to meet the new Post-Cold 
War challenges, but even more disturbing: that it took most of the period in question before signs 
of real improvements were seen. But Western Intelligence learned by trial-and-error, and gradually 
intelligence support to military operations improved. A closer cooperation between the strategic, 
operational and tactical intelligence levels has emerged, above all in the shape of a little known, 
little published MI activity called National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs). This paper will 
conclude that NISTs are seemingly the best examples today, not only on how MI, but intelligence 
overall should work: drawing upon and combining the best resources available in both military 
and civilian intelligence, and from all levels.
